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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs . 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership, and 




Case No. 880544-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The parties entered into a Purchase Agreement and 
Management Agreement in October 1985. Humphries, by and 
through counsel, sought to rescind that transaction without 
the necessity of litigation. That offer was rejected, and 
Plaintiff initiated this action seeking to enforce the terms 
of the Purchase Agreement, but denying liability for his 
obligations under the Management Agreement. Humphries 
counterclaimed and sought rescission of the contract, 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation arising from the 
Purchase Agreement, indemnification for certain obligations 
assumed by Humphries on Wright's behalf, and damages arising 
from the termination of the Management Agreement. 
Prior to trial, the Court specifically enforced the 
Purchase Agreement and the Management Agreement, ordered 
Humphries paid pursuant to the Management Agreement while he 
served as manager, and reserved all other issues for trial. 
After a five-day jury trial in April of 1988, the 
matter was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. 
The jury found that Wright had fraudulently misrepresented 
the value of his property and awarded appropriate damages to 
Humphries. The jury also found that Wright had wrongfully 
terminated Humphries as the manager, and awarded damages of 
$15,000. The jury further determined that Wright should pay 
a certain $30,000 promissory note, that Humphries should pay 
the $15,000 promissory note addressed in the Purchase 
Agreement, and that Humphries was entitled to attorney's 
fees in the amount of $10,000. Finally, the jury ordered 
Humphries to pay Wright certain monies used by Humphries 
while in control of the nursery, which resulted in an offset 
against the total amount awarded Humphries. 
Post-trial, the Court took away the judgment in favor 
of Humphries arising from Wright's breach of the Management 
Contract, resulting in a net judgment in favor of Humphries 
of $68,780.21. The Court also denied Wright's motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial and 
Wright thereafter appealed. 
Humphries cross-appealed, seeking to have the wrongful 
termination award of $15,000 reinstated, awarding him 
pre-judgment interest on damages for the fraud committed, 
and indemnification for interest and attorney's fees as set 
forth in the $30,000 promissory note which the jurv found 
Wright was obligated to pay. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In addition to the issues identified by Wright in his 
brief, the following issues also remain on appeal: 
1. Based on standards of appellate review, has Wright 
demonstrated that the facts most favorable to the trial 
court's judgment are insufficient to support the judgment? 
2. Has Wright sustained his burden on appeal that the 
juryfs verdict was totally unsupported by the evidence? 
3. Did the trial court err in dismissing, post-
verdict, Humphries1 claim for wrongful termination, for 
which the jury awarded Humphries damages in the sum of 
$15,000? 
4. Did the trial court err in ruling, post-trial, that 
Humphries was not entitled to pre-judgment interest on the 
damages awarded to him? 
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5. Did the trial court err in ruling, post-trial, that 
Wright was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the amounts 
that Humphries was ordered to pay? 
6. Did the trial court err by failing to totally 
indemnify Humphries by: (1) refusing to order Wright to pay 
post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in the promis-
sory note for $30,000; and (2) refusing to order Wright to 
pay attornev's fees and other costs reauired in said prom-
issory note in the event of a default? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Neither Wright nor Humphries takes the position that 
there are determinative constitutional provisionsf statutesf 
ordinances or rules which control, or are applicable inf 
this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE NURSERY BEFORE THE SALE 
Westside Nursery had been in business for a number of 
years prior to October 4, 1985. It was owned by a limited 
partnership, and the premises were leased from one of the 
limited partners (T.71-75) . It was located on the main 
highway between St. George and Santa Clara, and thus had 
good exposure to the traveling public. Books and records 
were maintained by the partnership, with the accounting done 
by Grant Tucker, an accountant with considerable experience 
(T.879-881) . 
Prior to the sale of the nursery on October 4, 1985, 
the books and records were made available by Humphries to 
Wright (Exhibit 1, paragraph 9(c); Addendum A). In 
additionf Wright received a balance sheet for Westside 
Nursery dated July 21
 r 1985 (Exhibit 14) indicating net 
worth cf $144,433.52 (T.781). Wright also received a 
balance sheet dated September 20, 1985 showing net worth of 
$140f939.03 (Exhibit 16). Prior to the sale, and in an 
attempt to determine actual value, Humphries and his employees 
took an inventory of plant materials and supplies 
(Exhibits 22 and 23) . To this amount was added current 
assets as identified on the respective balance sheets. 
Therefore, the balance sheet of October 1, 1985 revised the 
inventory from $134,027.40 down to $60f000 resulting in a 
net value of the nursery as per the balance sheet prepared 
by the accountant in the sum of $95,536.11 (T.837, Exhibit 
17, Addendum E). 
Even after the nursery was sold to Wright, the balance 
sheet of October 30, 1985 still showed inventory of 
$60,950.00, plus other fixed assets, with a net worth of 
$97,828.85 (Exhibit 18) . 
It has always been Humphries1 position, as the manager 
and general partner of Westside Nursery, that the nursery 
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was worth $90,000 to $100,000 when he sold it to Wright. 
(T.703r Exhibit 69, Addendum C, Exhibit 75, Addendum D). 
At the time of trial, the nursery had been closed for 
business for some time at Wright's election. 
THE PARTIES 
Humphries met Wright in the summer of 1985 when 
Humphries assisted in the landscaping of Wright's recently 
acquired home at Green Valley. Wright had a passion for 
exotic plants and thought it would be both a great idea and 
a financially attractive proposal to introduce exotic plants 
into the St. George area and particularly, eucalyptus trees 
that would not lose their leaves during the winter 
(T.8 6-87) . To do thatf he needed to acquire an existing 
facility, so negotiations began after Wright and Humphries 
developed a friendship between themselves and their wives 
(T.124-126) . Humphries testified that he had a great deal 
of lovef admiration and respect for Wright before any 
dispute arose (T.694-5, 698-99). Wright had been in the 
real estate development business since 1957 (T.1032). 
NEGOTIATIONS AND DOCUMENTS 
In August of 1985, Wright flew Humphries in his private 
plane, using his personal pilot, from St. George to Ogden. 
Humphries spent the night at Wright's home, but Wright did 
not show Humphries the Ogden property at that time 
(T.82-83). 
The parties and their wives returned to Ogden by 
vehicle on October 2, 1985. Wright picked up the Purchase 
Agreement and the Management Agreement (Exhibits 1 and 2, 
Addendums A and B) drafted by his attorney after picking up 
Humphries and his wife, but did not disclose that he had 
done so until October 5, 1985 when the documents were 
ultimately signed (T.91-93). Humprhies testified that the 
agreements were signed before he was shown the land by 
Wright (T.94). 
After signing the documents, the parties went to a 
local title company in Ogden where Wright signed the deeds. 
Wright represented in the Purchase Agreement that title to 
the property was free and clear of encumbrances and agreed 
to provide at his own expense a policy of title insurance 
covering the value of the land conveyed (Exhibit 1, 
paragraph 2(a); Addendum A ) . Humphries has never received a 
policy of title insurance for the value of the property 
conveyed as required by the Purchase Agreement. An 
examination of (Exhibit 52, Addendum G) the Commitment for 
Title Insurance obtained by Wright, reveals Wright's 
dilemma. The Commitment fails to indicate the "amount" that 
the property was to be insured for in favor of Humphries. 
If Wright had directed the title company to provide the 
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title insurance that he was required to provide under the 
Purchase Agreementf and if he had insured Humphries1 
property for $90,000, then he could not take the position 
that his property was worth anything less than that amount. 
If Wright insured the property for less than $90,000, 
Humphries would have been on notice that he had not received 
property having a value of $90,0 00 in exchange for the 
nursery. Rather than do either, Wright did nothing, and the 
jury justifiably found that Wright breached the Purchase 
Agreement by failing to provide a policy of title insurance 
insuring the value of the land conveyed, together with other 
breaches of the contracts in question. 
At the time Humphries received title, the property was 
encumbered by unpaid real property taxes in the sum of 
$398.06 for taxable years 1981 through 1984 (Exhibit 52), 
and those taxes were not paid by Wright until March of 1986, 
well after the litigation was underway (T. 586) . 
Prior to the time the agreements were executed, Wright 
told Humphries the three acres he was going to deed to him 
were worth $30,000 per acre or collectively $90,000 (T.710, 
775, 776). Simultaneously, Humphries told Wright the value 
of the nursery was between $90,000 and $100,000 and 
testified that they (meaning Wright and Humphries) had come 
to an agreement on what Wright valued his property to be 
worth and what Humphries valued the nursery to be worth 
(T.710). Prior to the sale, Wright also told the accountant 
for the nursery, Grant Tucker, that the subject property had 
a value of $90,000 and did so in the presence of Humphries 
(T.883) . Wright made this statement when Tucker said he 
thought the nursery was worth more than $90,000. After the 
sale, Wright told his employee, Chad Eskelson, that the 
property was worth at least $100,000 (T.592) Eskelsen was 
also a good friend cf Humphries. After Humphries became 
concerned and voiced it to Wright, Wright again told 
Humphries and his wife that the property had a value in 
excess of $90,000 (T.595). 
After the documents were signed, the parties went to 
view the property, during which Wright told Humphries that 
he had been a real estate developer in Ogden and that his 
subdivisions had been successful (T.713). Concerning the 
subject property, Humphries testified Wright told him: 
"Darrel, this is the last of the property. This 
is my most prime piece of ground that we have 
left. It is the last one yet to develop. And 
when I finish developing this particular acreage 
that I am going to be showing you, then my dream 
would (sic) have been completed for Ogden." 
(T.713). 
Humphries specifically testified that Wright did not 
tell him about any of the problems relating to the subject 
property, and specifically did not mention any problems 
concerning the potential building moratorium and how it 
might prevent future development (T.715). Nor did Wright 
make any mention to Humphries of the recent conversations he 
had had with the representatives of the Weber County 
Planning and Zoning Commission. On cross-examination, 
Wright admitted that he received the following information 
from the Weber County officials prior to the time he 
transferred the property to Humphries: 
1. That there existed the possibility that a 
building moratorium might be enacted for the area 
of the subject property and that it would affect 
Wright's property (T.555-556). 
2. That there had been septic tank problems 
up on the hillside in the area of the subject 
property resulting in elevated coliform levels in 
the water; that there were some political 
influences being exercised to get the area 
condemned for low interest money from the state; 
and that the state governmental officials had been 
out and looked at the problem (T.559). 
3. That there had been a group of citizens 
complaining about existing problems for the area 
in question (T.561). 
4. That the county had been getting a lot of 
pressure to close the area down which would stop 
subdividing so that the county could get a lower 
interest rate on needed improvements (T.56 3). 
5. That the county would have to come out 
and judge each parcel on a piece-by-piece basis 
and that there would not be any more subdivisions 
in the county wherein Weber County would give 
blanket approval of a subdivision without 
inspection (T.563-564). 
6. That one of the tests to be performed by 
the county would be a "perc test" to see if 
adequate water percolation on the land existed. 
If the land didn't pass a perc testf then approval 
would be denied (T.564-565, 855). 
On cross-examination, Wright admitted that he never 
told Humphries of the existence of any of the problems 
outlined above prior to the time he deeded the property to 
him (T.565-67). Humphries confirmed that prior to the sale, 
Wright did not disclose to him any of the problems outlined 
above (T.715-16). 
After the dispute arose, Wright reaffirmed his 
representation to Humphries that the property had a value of 
$90,000 (T.736-37). However on cross-examination, Wright 
finally admitted that he earlier testified at his deposition 
that he did not know the value of the subject property at 
the time he told Humphries it was worth $90,000 (T.1032). 
The building moratorium (Exhibit 27, Addendum F) was 
enacted on October 15, 1985, eleven days after Wright deeded 
the property to Humphries. 
WHY THE CONTROVERSY AROSE 
After the parties executed the agreements and Wright 
became the owner of the nursery, Humphries continued to 
manage it pursuant to the Management Agreement. Wright 
began ordering exotic plants while attending shows in Reno 
and Louisiana (T.124). Humphries began to hear stories 
concerning Wright's lack of integrity (T.130, 1015-16). By 
late November of 1985, Humphries became concerned about the 
value of the property in Weber County based on what he had 
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heard about Wright (T.131). He also became concerned 
because he had not received copies of the agreements, even 
though he had requested copies from Wright four to six times 
(T. 740) • Finally, Humphries had to resort to a "cloak and 
dagger" scheme to get copies by wrestling them from Wright 
as he was leaving the public library (T.140-43). 
As previously indicated, Wright also breached the 
Purchase* Agreement by failing to provide Humphries with a 
policy of title insurance insuring the value of the land at 
$90,000, and by failing to convey the land free and clear at 
closing., 
Because Humphries became concerned that he had received 
property having a value far less than that of the nursery, 
and after he obtained copies of the documents, he contacted 
his attorney and also obtained a preliminary appraisal which 
indicated that the property had a value of as little as 
$35,000 (T.918-19). In an attempt to settle the matter 
short of litigation, Humphries had his attorney send Wright 
a letter, certified mail, dated December 10, 1985, which 
Wright refused to accept (Exhibit 69, Addendum C) . By 
December 18, 1985, Humphries had received a written 
appraisal confirming the value of the property to be as low 
as $35,000, and therefore on that date, Humphries had his 
attorney send Wright another letter in an attempt to resolve 
the matter short of litigation. The letter included a 
proposed agreement to rescind the transaction (Exhibit 75, 
Addendum D) . Wright rejected any attempt to resolve the 
matter and filed suit shortly thereafter. 
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES POST-SALE AND DURING 
INITIAL LITIGATION 
After the sale of the nursery, Wright and Humphries, by 
mutual agreement, continued to use the same checking 
account, but Wriqht did not add his name as a signator, 
leaving the management decisions and payment of bills up to 
Humphries (T.7 21). Until the incident at the public library 
on December 5, 1985, the parties were on an extremely 
friendly basis, which even continued for a period of time 
thereafter until Humphries sought the aid of counsel. 
Even though Wright obtained a Temporary Restraining 
Order in December of 1985, he did not seek to have Humphries 
removed as the manager until March of 1986. 
The best months for a nursery in St. George are March, 
April and May, with a slow down for the next few months, and 
a moderate resurgence in September, October and November. 
Because spring comes much earlier in Utah's Dixie than the 
rest of the state, a nursery in that area starts buying 
plants, seeds and related products and begins planting in 
the greenhouses as early as November or December of each 
year. This naturally creates a demand for money to pay for 
products purchased, but v/ithout a resulting cash flow until 
the high sales volume occurs in March. 
Prior to the sale, Humphries had obtained a line of 
credit with Zions First National Bank in St. George, and had 
initially obtained a $15,000 loan, the repayment of which is 
addressed in the Purchase Agreement. 
Being somewhat naive in business matters, Humphries 
continued to use his line of credit to borrow additional 
funds for the nursery even though he had sold the nursery to 
Wright. Because of the pressing financial needs of the 
nursery and an overdraft checking account, Humphries signed 
a second promissory note for $30,000 in favor of Zions on 
December 10, 1985 (Exhibit 20, T.797, 991). Humphries 
actually made arrangements to obtain the funds prior to 
December 5, 1985 (T.143). Humphries drew $15,000 against 
the note on December 13, 1985, an additional $5,000 on 
December 30, 1985, and a final $10,000 on January 6, 1986. 
All draws were deposited, in full, into the Westside Nursery 
account (T.991). 
Wright testified that his agreement with Humphries was 
that if money had to be borrowed on the Zions account, he 
would co-sign the note so the money would be repaid, but he 
had to approve the loan in advance, and it had to be for 
nursery business (Summary of Wright's testimony by the trial 
court, T.526). Wright initially testified that after 
October 4, 1985, he never considered or asked Darrel 
Humphries to go to 3 ions and borrow additional funds 
(T.527). However, Wright's testimony was clearly impeached 
on that issue (T.527-31) . On cross- examination Wright was 
given his handwritten notes which he identified as being 
written prior to November 11, 1985, notes he did not know 
Humphries had in his possession. Under the heading "Things 
to do for $" we find in Wright's personal handwriting: 
"Have Darrell (sic) get Loan to cover new materiels (sic)" 
(Exhibit 67 p.2, Addendum H) . Wright conceded on 
cross-examination that the $30,000 loan was used to purchase 
plant and other materials (T.1030), having earlier signed an 
affidavit to that effect on February 15, 1986, 
The jury found that Wright should pay the $30,000 note 
and Humphries was awarded judgment by the trial court in the 
sum of $37,305.21, which was the principal plus accrued 
interest as per the terms of the note as of the date of 
trial (R.245; Addendum I, p.6, 1.14). Of course, Humphries 
remains personally liable on the note and has only a 
judgment against Wright for the amount specified less 
offsets in Wright's favor. It is Humphries1 position that 
the court erred in not awarding a continuing judgment 
against Wright for interest Humphries will have to pay 
according to the terms of said note, plus attorney's fees 
Humphries will also have to pay if Zions forecloses. The 
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basis of this argument is that Wright testified that if 
money was needed to be borrowed at Zions, he would sign a 
note due the same date as the money was to be repaid. The 
court so summarized Wright's testimony, but thereafter 
denied Humphries1 request to completely indemnify Humphries 
consistent with the terms of the promissory note Humphries 
signed and for which he will ultimately be responsible. 
From October 4, 1985 through March 19, 1986, Wright 
only deposited enough money in the nursery account to pay 
two months rentf or approximately $6f000f leaving the 
business to operate on borrowed money or existing cash flow 
(T.122-23). He did this in spite of a substantial increase 
in inventory and the "gearing up" for the spring and summer 
months. Humphries had to borrow money in order to keep the 
business operational and to perform as his Management 
Agreement required. The efforts made by Humphries on 
Wright's behalf from October 4, 1985 through March 19, 1986 
are depicted in the photographs taken at the time Humphries 
was removed as manager and possession of the nursery given 
to Wright (Exhibit 47f photograph binder). At trial it was 
apparent to the jury that Wright intentionally left 
Humphries in as manager until late March so that he could 
utilize his expertise in the field and have the nursery in 
top shape for the spring season, with full knowledge that 
Humphries could not compete with Wright because of the non-
competition clause in favor of Wright in the Management 
Agreement earlier enforced by the trial court. The jury 
found that Wright breached the Management Agreement and 
awarded Humphries six months pay at the rate of $2,500 per 
month for a total of $15,000. Humphries testified that he 
was not able to find gainful employment for six months after 
he was removed as manager (T.812-13). 
The jury also found that Humphries breached the 
parties1 agreements and awarded Wright damages in the amount 
of $6,805, basically reimbursing Wright for monies spent by 
Humphries for Humphries1 personal benefit while he was the 
manager (R.242). The court also ordered Humphries to pay 
Wright for all accounts payable in excess of $5,000 owed as 
of October 4, 1985, or the sum of $6,772. Humphries never 
denied he didn't owe accounts payable in excess of $5,000 
(R.245). The court, post-trial, awarded Wright pre-judgment 
interest on $13,577, but refused to award Humphries pre-
judgment interest on $20,198.21 Wright was ordered to pay 
after offsets, and likewise refused to grant pre-judgment 
interest on damages awarded by reason of the fraud committed 
by Wright (R.245-46). Specifically, the court refused to 
grant pre-judgment interest to Humphries on the $38,582 from 
and after October 4, 1985 until the time of judgment 
(R.246). Of course, no pre-judgment interest was awarded 
Humphries on the $15,000 originally awarded by the jury, 
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because the court took that award away from Humphries, 
post-trial. Humphries contends that it was error for the 
court to award pre-judgment interest to Wright for damages 
in his favor but to deny Humphries pre-judgment interest on 
the amounts awarded to him. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury properly concluded and the trial court 
properly sustained the jury verdict that (1) Wright mis-
represented the value of the property conveyed to Humphries 
and (2) that Wright should pay Humphries for the $30,0 00 
note borrowed by Humphries and deposited to the Westside 
Nursery account and spent on nursery debts. Wright has 
failed to establish, as appellate review requires, that the 
facts most favorable to the trial court judgment are insuf-
ficient to support that judgment. 
The evidence not only establishes misrepresentations 
concerning value that substantiate a finding of fraud, but 
supports a finding that Wright made statements concerning 
the value of the Ogden property recklessly or with knowledge 
that said statements were false. Furthermore, the failure 
to disclose vital information concerning value or restric-
tions on the development potential of the property negates 
Wright's claim that an opinion concerning value stated in 
good faith is not actionable as fraud. 
The trial court should not have taken away the jury 
verdict in favor of Humphries for ?15,000 arising from 
Wright1s breach of the Management Agreement, despite 
Wright's defense of justification, when in fact the jury 
found, and the trial court sustained a finding, that Wright 
breached both the Purchase Agreement and the Management 
Agreement, particularly since Wright did not object to the 
form cf the Special Verdict before it was filed. 
Finally, the trial court erroneously awarded Wright 
pre-judgment interest on damages running in his favor while 
at the same time, denied pre-judgment interest for damages 
running in favor of Humphries. 
As a result of the foregoing, this Court should affirm 
the finding of fraud and indemnification in favor of 
Humphries, reverse the trial court and reinstate the $15,000 
awarded Humphries for breach of the Management Agreement, 
grant pre-judgment interest in favor of both parties, 
affirm Humphries1 award of attorney's fees in the sum of 
$10,000, and grant Humphries further indemnification on the 
$30,000 promissory note according to the terms thereof, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WRIGHT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FACTS 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ARE 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT JUDGMENT 
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Because Wright's appeal is based, for the most part, on 
claims of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court must 
uphold the judgment of the trial court unless Wright is able 
to demonstrate that the facts most favorable to that 
judgment are insufficient to support it. 
In Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986), the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Under familiar rules of appellate review, the 
Court views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the judgment of the trial court, and 
the findings of the trial court will not be 
disturbed unless there is no substantial record 
evidence to support them. It is incumbent upon 
the appellant to marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and to then 
demonstrate that even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the factual determinations made 
by the trial court, that the evidence is 
insufficient to support its findings. 
728 P.2d at 982. 
In at least four cases, the appellate courts have 
declined to consider an attack based on the insufficiency of 
the evidence where the appellant failed, as Wright has 
failed, to first marshal the facts in support of the trial 
court's findings. See Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1985); J&M Const. Co. v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 (Utah 
1986); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. 
1987); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). 
The standard is equally applicable to jury verdicts. 
In Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 (Utah 1976), the jury, on 
special interrogatories, returned a verdict for defendant, 
and plaintiff appealed citing evidence favorable to her own 
point of view. The Supreme Court, at page 620, stated that 
plaintiff's argument was "based on the fallacy so prevalent 
in cases of this kind; that of basing a hypothesis on a view 
of the evidence favorable to one's own purpose and desires. 
This invades the province of the jury, whose prerogative it 
was to decide what evidence to believe." The jury verdict 
was affirmed. 
The general rule was irore recently articulated in 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co.y 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 
(Utah 1985) , the Court stating, "Where evidence is in 
conflict in a jury trial, we assume that the jury believed 
those facts that support its verdict, and we review the 
facts and reasonable inferences that arise from those facts 
in a light most supportive of the jury's verdict." 
Despite Wright's contention to the contrary, appellate 
courts do not review findings of fraud by the "clear and 
convincing" standard. In Faw v. Greenwood, 613 P. 2d 1338 
(Idaho 1980) , the plaintiff bought a business from the 
defendant. Prior to the sale, the defendant presented 
plaintiff with profit and loss statements and plaintiff 
examined the business books. Plaintiff later alleged that 
defendant had defrauded him and brought suit. Defendant 
counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court 
ruled in favor of defendant on both plaintiff's complaint 
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and defendant's counterclaim, and plaintiff appealed. The 
Idaho Supreme Court, at page 1340, stated, "The issue as to 
whether fraud has been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence is for the determination of the trier of fact. On 
appeal that determination will not be reversed where 
supported by competent, substantial though conflicting 
evidence." Our Supreme Court also has recognized the 
"substantial and competent" test as the proper standard for 
reviewing findings of fraud. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) at page 769. See also Stauth v. Brown, 
734 P.2d 1063 (Kan. 1987) . 
POINT II 
HUMPHRIES CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE OF FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION 
A. 
ELEMENTS OF FRAUD 
For purposes of consistency, Humphries will address the 
elements of fraud in the same order as identified by Wright. 
The jury was instructed consistent with Pace v« 
Parrish, 122 Utah 144, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), concerning the 
nine elements necessary to find fraud. They are as follows: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; (6) that the other party acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
did in fact relv upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
247 P.2d at 274-75. 
Before discussing these respective elements, the 
Court's attention is directed to Wright's failure to 
acknowledge or address the material facts concerning 
elements (2) , (3) , (4) (a) (b) and (5) above, discussed on 
pages 8-11 of this brief. 
B. 
STATEMENTS REGARDING VALUE AS AN ELEMENT OF FRAUD 
Wright cites what he claims to be the case most 
directly on point, to-wit, Baird v. Eflow Inv. Co., 76 Utah 
232f 289 P. 112 (1930). Not only is the case distinguish-
able on its facts, but the general rule is not quoted in its 
entirety in appellant's brief. The court stated: 
It is the general rule that misrepresentations as 
to value do not ordinarily constitute fraud, as 
they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion 
or "trader's talk" involving matter of judgment 
and estimation as to which men may differ. [Cita-
tions omitted]. For such representions to be 
actionable they must be coupled with concealment 
of material facts or with artifice or misrepresen-
tation used to prevent the hearer from learning 
the truth, or be made under such circumstances as 
to indicate that the hearer will rely on them, as 
when the truth of the speaker's statement is a 
controlling element of the transaction, or because 
confidential relations exist. 
289 P. at 114. 
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Baird is further distinguishable in that the owner of 
the ranch in Montana employed defendants as brokers to find 
a purchaser for it and ultimately the brokers acted for both 
parties. Also, the buyer had substantial information 
available to him. The court stated: 
The plaintiff knew that the brokers were acting 
for both sides to the trade. He, with his wife, 
made a trip to Salt Lake City from Montana for the 
purpose and did inspect the apartments. He 
consulted a banker in Montana, who he said was his 
business adviser, concerning the trade before he 
made it. He also consulted a lawyer of his own 
selection in Salt Lake City concerning the legal 
phases of the matter. He inquired repeatedly 
about the details of the income and expenses of 
the apartments, and was furnished a true statement 
thereof before he completed his contract. There 
was nothing done by defendants to prevent the 
plaintiff from making the fullest inquiry and 
investigation concerning the value of the 
apartments. 
289 P. at 114. 
There is a great difference between a representation 
made as statement of opinion and a representation made as 
statement of fact. As stated in 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and 
Deceit § 112 (1968): 
Whether a misrepresentation as to value is merely 
an expression of opinion, or an affirmation of 
fact or intentional misrepresentation to be relied 
upon, is generally regarded as a question of fact 
to be determined by the trier of facts. 
As further clarified in 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit 
§ 115 (1968) : 
There are many exceptions to the general rule that 
statements of value are not a sufficient basis for 
a charge of fraud, such exceptions arising out of 
the special circumstances under which the repre-
sentations are made. It cannot be laid down as a 
matter of law that value is never a material fact. 
For example, the general rule that such statements 
are not actionable applies only where the parties 
stand on an equal footing and have equal means of 
knowledge, with no relation of trust or confidence 
existing between them. Likewise, a statement of 
value may be of such a character, so made and 
intended, and so received, as to constitute 
fundamental misrepresentation; and if it is made 
as an assertion of fact, and with the purpose that 
it shall be so received, and it is so received, it 
may amount to a fraud. Moreover, a statement of 
value involving and coupled with a statement of a 
material fact is fraud. 
After the contract was signed and while the parties 
were enroute to the subject property, Wright made represen-
tations to Humphries that the surrounding property consis-
tently sold for $30,000 per acre (T.588-90), and that the 
subject property in a developed state would bring $30,000 
per lot (as compared to $30,000 per acre) (T.590). 
Approximately two years after the transaction, the subject 
property sold for only $18,233 per acre. 
The following statement from 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and 
Deceit § 118 (1968) , entitled "Market value or market 
price", has direct application: 
While different conclusions have been reached 
under varying fact situations, most of the courts 
support the proposition that representations of 
market price or market value are not necessarily 
mere representations of opinion, but are, or at 
least under some circumstances may be, represen-
tations of fact on which fraud may be predicated. 
For instance, a representation that a certain kind 
of property, constantly sold, has a market at 
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certain figures and that it readily sells at those 
figures, has been held to be not a statement of 
opinion, but one of factr upon which fraud may be 
predicated. Emphasis added. 
As stated in 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 119 
(1968) , other exceptions exist to the general rule that an 
opinion concerning value is not actionable: 
This is particularly true where the vendor or 
seller holds a position of trust and confidence 
toward the vendee which gives the latter the right 
to rely on the representationf or where the vendor 
or seller assumes tc have special knowledge of the 
value , and the vendee , to the former's knowledge, 
trusts entirely to the vendor's representations. 
In such cases the vendor or seller may justly be 
held liable for his false representations, because 
by them the purchaser is fraudulently induced to 
forbear inquiry as to their truth. This principle 
is especially applicable where land was situated 
at a great distance and the vendor knew that the 
purchaser was not conversant with the general 
value of the land in the locality and relied on 
his representations in respect thereto. Citations 
omitted. 
Wright also cites the case of Poison Co. v. Imperial 
Cattle Co. , 624 P.2d 993 (Mont. 1981), regarding opinion 
statements as elements of fraud, but that case can likewise 
be distinguished. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the 
trier of fact and stated: 
We emphasize, however, that it is singularly 
within the province of the District Court to 
determine whether fraud has been perpetrated on 
an innocent purchaser. The District Court is in 
the best position to weigh the factors involved, 
assess the credibility of witnesses, and 
conclude whether the statements regarding value 
constitute fact or opinion. 
624 P.2d at 996. 
The Poison court determines that it must view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party 
and presume the correctness of the District Court's 
judgment. The court clearly states that it is up to the 
trier of fact to determine if the representations as to 
value were opinion (not actionable) , as compared to 
declarations of fact (actionable), and concludes that it is 
not the proper function of the Supreme Court to exchange its 
opinion for that of the trier of fact, even if a different 
conclusion might have been reached. 
Wright cites the Arizona case of Frazier v. Southwest 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 653 P.2d 362 (Ariz. App. 1982) , in 
support of his position that fraud was not established. 
Frazier deals with both fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion. One of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations was 
that the subdivision was "ready to go". The court concluded 
that no fraud existed because there was no evidence of 
Southwest1s knowledge that the "ready to go" statements were 
made nor that Southwest knew that those representations were 
false. In the instant case, howeverf Wright admitted that 
he did not know the value of the property at the time the 
representations were made (i.e., reckless misrepresenta-
tion) , and that even though he knew of the potential for a 
building moratorium, he did not disclose the same to 
Humphries (i.e., concealment). In Frazier, the court 
0-7 
further described the relationship between the court and the 
jury in determining whether a duty to speak exists, citing 
with approval the following statement from Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 551, Comment m (1977): 
Whether there is a duty to the other to disclose 
the fact in question is always a matter for the 
determination of the court. If there are 
disputed facts bearing upon the existence of the 
duty, as for example the defendant's knowledge 
of the fact, the other's ignorance of it or his 
opportunity to ascertain itf the customs of the 
particular trade, or the defendant's knowledge 
that the plaintiff reasonably expects him to 
make the disclosure, they are to be determined 
by the jury under appropriate instructions as to 
the existence of the duty. 
653 P.2d at 368. 
Finally, Frazier is distinguishable in that Southwest 
had appraised the property because by law it could only loan 
7 5% of the appraised value. In the instant case, Wright did 
not have the property appraised and did not know the value 
of the property at the time he made factual representations 
as to its value which he admitted he intended Defendants to 
rely upon, and upon which Defendants did in fact rely in 
determining whether or not to consummate transaction. 
C. 
CONCEALMENT AS FRAUD 
Contrary to Wright's position, the building moratorium 
declared by the Weber County Commission eleven days after 
the transaction was consummated had significant impact en 
the value of the property. The appraiser called by 
Humphries, Les Froerer, testified as follows: 
Q. FRY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Did you rely on that 
moratorium in determining value? 
A. [BY MR. FROERER] I relied on that moratorium in 
attempting to get the highest and best use. But 
yes, it — indirectly, yes. 
Q. And just tell us why that moratorium would aid 
you in determining highest and best use. 
A. Either you can build homes on it, or you can't 
build homes on it. And the difference between 
being able to or not able to drastically affects 
value — changes the use. 
If it had to go back into agricultural usef you're 
going down to a much — to a nominal value. 
(T.920) . 
In Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963) , the 
facts somewhat parallel the instant case. In Elder, the 
evidence showed that the seller knew that a quarantine 
existed on the farm premises to be sold, that the existence 
thereof could materially affect the economic operation of 
the farmf and that he failed to disclose the same to the 
buyer. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's 
dismissal of plaintiff's suit to rescind and remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed 
in the opinion. The court noted that the buyer had no 
occasion to make an independent investigation of the 
quarantine of which he knew nothing. In the instant case, 
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Wright knew that a building moratorium was imminently 
likely, and that the moratorium was not of public record. 
Humphries, acting reasonably, could not have discovered the 
facts necessary to require him to make an independent 
investigation. The court concluded in Elder that there was 
a suppression of the truth, which the party with superior 
knowledge had a duty to disclose, and that the same amounted 
to fraud. The Supreme Court in support of its decision, 
citing American Jurisprudence, stated: 
One of the fundamental tenets of the Anglo-
American law of fraud is that fraud may be 
committed by the suppression of the truth * * * 
as well as the suggestion of falsehood * * * *. 
Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must 
relate to a material matter known to the party and 
which it is his legal duty to communicate to the 
other contracting party, whether the duty arises 
from a relation of trust, from confidence, 
inequality of condition and knowledge, or other 
attendant circumstances * * * . 
The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it 
relates to nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is 
maintainable where a party who knows material 
facts is under a duty, under the circumstances, to 
speak and disclose his information, but remains 
silent * *. 
Although the pertinent inquiry in any case where 
fraud on the basis of nondisclosure is asserted is 
whether, upon any particular occasion, it was the 
duty of the person to speak on pain of being 
guilty of a fraud by reason of his silence, except 
in broad terms the law does not attempt to define 
the occasions when a duty to speak arises. On the 
contrary, there has been adopted, as a leading 
principle, the proposition that whether a duty to 
speak exists is determinable by reference to all 
the circumstances of the case and by comparing the 
facts not disclosed with the object and end in 
view by the contracting parties. The difficulty 
is not so much in stating the general principles 
of lawf which are pretty well understood, as in 
applying the law to particular groups of facts * * 
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated 
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as 
to certain facts is a factor in determining that a 
duty of disclosure is owing. There is much 
authority to the effect that if one party to a 
contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or 
knowledge which is not within the fair and 
reasonable reach of the other party and which he 
could not discover by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, or means of knowledge which are not 
open to both parties alike, he is under a legal 
obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes 
fraud, especially when the other party relies upon 
him to communicate to him the true state of facts 
to enable him to judge of the expediency of the 
bargain. 
384 P.2d at 804-05. Emphasis added. 
D. 
KNOWLEDGE OF FALSITY OR REPRESENTATIONS 
MADE RECKLESSLY AS AN ELEMENT OF FRAUD 
Wright claims "good faith" because of an opinion letter 
(Exhibit 32) stating that 5.39 acres located on the south 
end of the same 22 acre tract had a value of $32,500 per 
acre. The letter is dated May 8, 1985 and directed to Ed 
Suppington, St. George, Utah, not Wright. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate when Wright obtained a copy of the 
letter or knew of its contents prior to the sale to 
Humphries, save and except that the bank to which the letter 
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was directed loaned Wright money based on the land having a 
value of $20f000 per acre, not $32f500 per acre. The only 
evidence at trial was that Wright showed Humphries this 
letter after Humphries became concerned that he had been 
defrauded (T.596-600). 
The fact that Wright did not have an opinion for the 
value of the property at the time of the transaction and 
thereafter made reckless representations concerning value is 
supported by the record. At trial, Wright was asked if he 
had previously testified that he did not have an opinion as 
to the value of the three acres he deeded to Humphries as of 
the date of the transfer. Wright denied having given that 
previous testimony. He was then asked to read from his 
deposition taken on February 20, 1986, and the following 
exchange appears in the trial transcript: 
Q. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Did I ask you the 
question: "You've been involved in the real 
estate business since 1957, at least; is that 
correct?" 
A. [BY MR. WRIGHT] Yes. 
Q. Your answer was "yes." "Q. On October 4, 1985, 
did you have an opinion as to the value of the 
three acres you deeded to Mr. and Mrs. Humphries?" 
What was your answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. "Q. You couldn't form an opinion as to value?" 
What was your Answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. Then did I ask you: "Who do you believe would 
be a qualified person to form an opinion as to the 
value of that property?" What was your answer? 
A. "The buyer who mav buv it. You know, whomever 
may buy it." (T.1032-1033). 
In spite of the fact that Wright had no opinion 
concerning the value of the three acres of property on 
October 4, 1985, the testimony from both Wright and 
Humphries was that Wright consistently told Humphries the 
property was worth at least $90,000. 
In Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 
1967) , the court recognized the principle that under some 
circumstances there may be a cause of action for fraud for a 
reckless or negligent misrepresentation: 
Where one having a pecuniary interest in a 
transaction, is in a superior position to know 
material facts, and carelessly or negligently 
makes a false representation concerning them, 
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, 
and the other party reasonably does so and suffers 
loss in that transaction, the representor can be 
held responsible if the other elements of fraud 
are also present. 
423 P.2d at 662. 
The footnote to the language just cited further 
clarifies the court's position: 
This is a variant of one of the traditionally accepted 
elements of fraud as set forth in Pace v. Parrish, 122 
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, Element No. (4), that the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) makes 
recklessly, knowing he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such a representation; see also Stuck v. 
Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 P.791. 
423 P.2d at 662. 
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978), affirms 
the fact that reckless conduct can be actionable. In 
Schwartz , Justice Gordon Hall writing the unanimous opinion, 
affirmed the trial court's finding of fraud, and stated: 
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the 
multifarious means which human ingenuity can 
devise and are resorted to in order to gain 
advantage over another. In its general or generic 
sense, it comprises all acts, omissions and 
concealments involving a breach of legal or 
equitable duty and resulting damage to another. 
• * * * 
The elements of actionable fraud to be proved are 
a false representation of an existing material 
fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose 
of inducing reliance thereon, upon which plaintiff 
reasonably relies to his detriment. (Citing Pace 
v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952)). Emphasis 
added. 
576 P.2d at 875. 
Wright claims that the failure to disclose the building 
moratorium or elevated coliform levels was not a material 
omission on his part and was not a serious factor in 
determining the value of the subject property. The jury and 
the trial court both heard this same argument and chose to 
reject it. 
In Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 
(Utah 1980) , the court made note of the fact that the 
potential buyer could have discovered by inquiry into the 
public records that Defendant owned no interest in the 
subject property. The evidence in the instant case is that 
a preliminary title report was presented to Humphries at 
closing, which failed to indicate a building moratorium, or 
the potential for one. In Sugarhouse Finance, the court 
recognized that misrepresentation may be made either by 
affirmative statement or by material omission where there 
exists a duty to speak, but that such a duty will not be 
found where the parties deal at arms length, and where the 
underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both 
parties. Clearly, in the instant case, the potential for a 
building moratorium and other problems with the property 
were not within the knowledge of both Wright and Humphries, 
and therefore Wright had an obligation to disclose the same. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THE OBLIGATION OF 
WRIGHT TO INDEMNIFY HUMPHRIES ON THE $30,0 00 NOTE 
After the Purchase Agreement and Management Agreement 
were signed, Wright opted to continue to use the existing 
Westside Nursery checking account and did not even request 
that he become a signatory on the account (T.726). Like-
wise, Wright asked Humphries not to tell anyone that the 
nursery had been sold because Wright had not established a 
credit rating in the St. George area and particularly with 
Zions Bank (T.721, 724). In late October, Wright, Humphries 
and their wives, drove to the west coast in Wright's motor 
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home to buy new materials (T.722). Humphries estimates that 
they spent somewhere between $15f000 and $20f0 00 in buying 
new materials for the nursery (T.723). Humphries testified 
that he had a discussion with Ron Wright that there was not 
sufficient money in the checking account to cover checks in 
that amount, and because it would put the checking account 
in an overdraft position, Wright gave Humphries directions 
to borrow an additional $30,000 from Zions Bank (T.723; also 
Exhibit 67 , Addendum H) . Because Humphries had established 
a good relationship with Zions, he obtained the $30,000, 
using his line of credit, the implication being that Wright 
did not want to sign any promissory note if he wasn't forced 
to do so. Of significance is the fact that Section 1 of the 
Contract for Management Services (Addendum B) requires 
Humphries to "perform pursuant to the orders, advice and 
direction of owner". 
Humphries made arrangements for and signed the 
promissory note on December 10, 1985, approximately two 
weeks before he was served with any restraining order. Only 
as demands on the checking account required funds, did he 
draw against that line of credit (Exhibits 70 through 74, 
consisting of bank statements and check stubs for 1985 and 
1986) . 
Wright claims Humphries should be denied indemnifica-
tion for three reasons cited on page 43 of his brief. Those 
same arguments were made to the court, in his JNOV motion, 
and were rejected based on a review of the evidence and the 
jury verdict. The jury could have easily believed that 
Humphries was only following the directions he had been 
given by Wright, and clearly, there was a need to cover the 
purchase of new plant materials due to the various buying 
trips. Furthermore, when Wright had Humphries served with a 
Temporary Restraining Order, he did not elect to terminate 
his employment as the manager cf Westside Nursery, and the 
jury could have easily determined that this was an 
affirmation that Humphries was doing a good job and the 
funds were in fact needed. Finally, all of the funds were 
deposited into the bank account of Westside Nursery and used 
to pay bills and other obligations. For the money the jury 
found Humphries to have wrongly spent from the account, 
Humphries is now obligated to repay Wright those exact 
amounts. In other words, Wright, not Humphries, benefited 
from the $30,000 borrowed, and the jury concluded that 
because Humphries was instructed to borrow the money, and 
because Wright received the benefit of the money, that 
Wright should pay the obligation. 
This issue was a factual issue to be decided by the 
jury and the jury decision in that regard should not be 
disturbed. The jury, in essence, completed an accounting 
and found that Humphries paid over to his employer all money 
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or other property he had received as manager, save and 
except the sum of $6,805 that Humphries v/as ordered to pay 
to Wright. 
POINT IV 
HUMPHRIES IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Contrary to Wright's position, Humphries succeeded in 
the enforceability of the contracts. He succeeded in 
obtaining a judgment of indemnification, which the jury 
could have found he was entitled to under either the 
Purchase Agreement or the Management Agreement. Likewise, 
he prevailed in that the jury found that Wright breached the 
Purchase Agreement by not transferring property having a 
value of $90,000 to Humphries. Furthermore, the evidence is 
unrebutted that Wright never provided Humphries with a 
policy of title insurance insuring the value of the subject 
property for $90,000 and did not convey clear title at 
closing. Finally, the jury awarded Humphries $15,000 
damages because Wright breached the Management Agreement, 
which should be reinstated by this court and would thus 
entitle Humphries to attorney's fees. 
Through trial Humphries incurred in excess of $30,000 
in attorney's fees (T.1039-43, Exhibit 84). The jury 
awarded less than one-third of attorney's fees incurred, 
requiring Humphries to absorb the difference. This Court 
should affirm the lower award of fees and award Humphries 
additional attorney's fees incurred in this appeal pursuant 
to the language of the Purchase Agreement. 
POINT V 
THE INJUNCTION BOND SHOULD NOT BE EXONERATED 
The court required Wright to post a bond when it gave 
possession of the nursery to him and issued a pre-judgment 
writ of attachment against Humphries1 property. At that 
timef Humphries could not compete with Wright due to the 
non-competition clause. If this court reinstates the 
judgment in the sum of $15f000 for breach of the Management 
Contract, then the injunctive bond serves to guarantee that 
Humphries will be paid because he was wrongfully enjoined 
after March 1986. 
Had Humphries been entitled to remain as manager of the 
nursery, and in control of the checking account as per the 
original agreement of the parties, he could have repaid the 
monies borrowed from Zions Bank in the normal course of 
business. Because he was restrained from doing so, and 
because the court ordered Wright to indemnify Humphries on 
the note, the Injunction Bond should remain in effect to 
also protect Humphries on that claim. 
Wright posted a $75,000 cash supersedeas bond for this 
appeal. Within three months thereafter, he filed for 
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act. His 
bankruptcy attorney, Gerald H. Suniville, has advised 
Humphries1 counsel that he may challenge the posting of the 
supersedeas bond as a preferential transfer. If that 
challenge is successful, Humphries will be left to seek 
collection of his judgment against a bankrupt individual. 
The better approach is to leave the Injunction Bond in 
place, and if the judgment is affirmed on appeal, allow the 
issue of the surety's liability to Humphries to be litigated 
in the district court. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED, 
POST-TRIAL, THE JURY AWARD ARISING FROM THE BREACH 
OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT BY WRIGHT 
In support of Wright's JNOV Motion, Wright claimed that 
the special interrogatories submitted to the jury were 
somehow defective. Wright did not submit a Special Verdict 
as did Humphries, did not raise objection as to the form of 
the Special Verdict used by the Court, and did not object to 
the filing of the verdict before the jury was dismissed (T. 
1141, 1146). 
In Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 417 P.2d 643 (Utah 1966), 
the court, at page 644, stated, "The trial judge's 
prerogative to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
can properly be exercised only in a situation where there is 
no reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the verdict 
of the jury." In the Schow case, plaintiffs had sued to 
have certain agreements declared void for fraud. On special 
interrogatories, the jury found for plaintiff. However the 
judge granted a JNOV Motion and plaintiffs appealed. The 
appellate court considered a "survey" of the evidence which 
revealed several facts which could have supported 
plaintiff's contention of fraud, and consequently remanded 
the case to the trial court for judgment in accordance with 
the jury verdict. 
In order for the trial court's JNOV on Wright's breach 
of the Management Agreement to stand, the trial court had to 
find as a matter of fact (not law) that no evidence existed 
to support the jury's verdict which rejected Wright's 
argument of justification. What the trial court failed to 
recognize is that the special interrogatory asks whether or 
not Humphries breached the agreements^ The jury could have 
readily concluded that Humphries breached the Purchase 
Agreement, as compared to the Management Agreement, and 
since Plaintiff failed to request a separate interrogatory 
concerning the breach of the Purchase Agreement versus the 
Management Agreement, it was error for the court to take 
away the jury verdict awarding Humphries $15,000 for 
Wright's breach of the Management Agreement. 
Furthermore, the fact that Wright was awarded damages 
by the jury for the breach by Humphries under one of the 
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agreements indicates that the jury took into account the 
breach and awarded damages based upon the evidence, but 
rejected Wright's claim of justification in firing 
Humphries. 
The jury specifically found that Wright breached the 
Management Agreement and awarded damages in the sum of 
$15,000. However, the jury also found that Wright breached 
the agreements^ in other respects, but awarded no damages. 
In other words, the jury apparently determined that both 
parties breached one agreement or the other, and awarded 
damages based upon the proof submitted. For the trial court 
to take away $15,000 on the theory of justification simply 
because the jury found Humphries breached the agreement^ 
(without a specific finding as to which agreement) and is 
thus barred from recovering under the Management Agreement 
is simply not supported by the evidence nor applicable law. 
Humphries maintains that the Special Verdict was clear, 
concise and unambiguous. However, if this Court should find 
otherwise, the Utah Supreme Court, in the recent case of 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 
1985) , has stated the rule and the duty imposed upon the 
parties and in this case on Wright: 
When special interrogatories or verdicts are 
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to 
object to the filing of the verdict or to move 
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for 
clarification. If a party fails to take 
appropriate action before the discharge of the 
verdict, that party generally may not later move 
for a new trial en the ground that the verdict was 
defective. 
701 P.2d at 1083. 
The court further states that only when the verdict is 
so ambiguous, contradictory or illogical that it does not 
clearly indicate for whom the verdict is rendered, should 
the trial court intervene. The fact the Humphries was 
awarded attorney's fees and Wright was notf is a clear 
indication that Humphries, and not Wright, prevailed. The 
Bennion opinion also explains that the rule requiring a 
timely objection serves to avoid the expense and additional 
time for a new trial in having the jury which heard the 
facts clarify the ambiguity while it is still able to do so. 
In the instant case, a reading of the Special Verdict 
does not place the Court in the position of having no 
alternative but to guess at what the jury intended as 
suggested by Wright. Wright would have the Court adopt a 
holding to the effect that simply because the jury found 
that Humphries breached one of the agreements, he is not 
entitled to recover under the Management Contract. The jury 
found that Wright breached the Management Contract and 
awarded damages. The Special Verdict could not have been 
clearer. Plaintiff's failure to submit a Special Verdict, 
and his subsequent failure to object to the filing of the 
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verdict or to move that the matter be resubmitted to the 
jury before discharge constitutes a waiver on the part of 
Plaintiff, thus directing the trial court to adopt the 
findings of the jury. 
Wright further argued to the trial court that 
"justification" for termination was not decided by the jury. 
Quite the contrary is true. The jury specifically found in 
Special Interrogatory No. 3 that Wright wrongfully 
terminated Humphries as an employee under the Management 
Agreement. If he was justified, it would not have been 
wrongful. By finding that Humphries was wrongfully 
terminated, the jury concluded that justification on the 
part of Wright to do so did not exist, and specifically 
rejected the reasons stated by Wright for terminating 
Humphries outlined in Wright's hand-written letter to 
Humphries dated March 19, 1986 (Exhibit 29f Addendum J). 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOW IT CALCULATED 
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST 
In L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const. Co., 608 P.2d 
626 (Utah 1980) , the court stated: 
Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded 
as damages due to the opposing party's delay in 
tendering the amount owing under an obligation. 
608 P.2d at 629. 
In Bjork v. April Indust. , Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 
1977), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he law in Utah is clear, viz: Where the damage 
is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as 
of a particular timef and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, interest should be 
allowed from that time and not from the date of 
the judgment. 
560 P.2d at 317. 
In this case, Humphries was entitled to receive 
property having a value of $90,000 on October 4, 1985, a 
date certain. His damages arose from a contract, as 
compared to a personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, or false imprisonment (see Bjork, supra). He 
should therefore receive pre-judgment interest from October 
4, 1985 to date of judgment on $38f582. 
Humphries1 entitlement to interest on damages awarded 
him by reason of indemnification on the $30f000 promissory 
note, is discussed above. Wright should be obligated to pay 
Humphries all amounts Humphries incurs arising from the 
$30f000 promissory note, including interest as set forth in 
the note, together with any costs or attorney's fees 
Humphries may be required to pay. To hold otherwise would 
award Humphries damages only through date of trial, plus the 
judgment rate of interest (12%) , and allow Wright to escape 
liability for the promissory note rate of interest (prime 
plus three percent) as well as any attorney's fees and costs 
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Humphries will incur because he has not been able to pay the 
note that is due on demand. 
POINT VIII 
COUNSEL'S REPLY TO ETHICAL ISSUE 
Wright's counsel's statement concerning the under-
signed's alleged ethical violation on page 39 of Appellant's 
Brief mandates a reply, even though Mr. Pendleton fails to 
recognize the appropriate forum to raise an ethical issue. 
The undersigned hesitates to utilize this brief to respond 
and the space taken could be better used to address issues 
at hand. However, failing to respond may be deemed 
acquiescence and therefore the court needs to understand the 
correct facts. 
1. After Humphries' brief in opposition to Wright's 
Motion for Judgment NOV was filed, Mr. Pendleton could have 
filed a motion to strike improper argument before submitting 
the same for decision to the trial court. He did nothing. 
2. To claim that Wright testified consistent with the 
depositions of Graham Shirra and Richard Schwartz is to 
state facts that are not of record and therefore improper, 
because neither Shirra nor Schwartz testified at trial, nor 
were their depositions used. In fact, Wright's testimony is 
not totally consistent with their depositions. 
3. If Mr. Pendleton thought the testimony of Shirra 
and Schwrartz to be consistent with that of Wright, he was 
free to call them as witnesses or read their depositions to 
support his client's position, and thereafter argue that 
significance to the jury. He chose to do neither. 
4. When Wright testified on direct examination in his 
case in chief, he was not asked, nor did he volunteer, the 
detailed conversations concerning the potential building 
moratorium, elevated coliform levels or discussions 
concerning water. That information had to be obtained by 
Humphries1 counsel on cross-examination and by requiring 
Wright to testify from his previously given deposition. 
Wright's "convenient memory" was always at issue. 
5. What Wright may have known concerning problems with 
the land and surrounding area may not have been limited to 
what he was told by Schirra and Schwartz. He had developed 
land in that area before and knew of flooding that occurred 
in the spring of 1982 that resulted in "Mustang Pond" at the 
lower end of his remaining undeveloped land which included 
the subject property. 
6. The statement that Wright may well have known more 
than he disclosed to the jury was made in a post-trial 
brief, not to the jury. Counsel is not precluded from 
arguing, either to the jury or to the Court, as to whether 
a witness testified accurately and completely, particularly 
since the credibility of the witnesses in this case was of 
critical importance. Chad Eskelsen testified without 
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objection that Wright's reputation for truthfulness in St. 
George was very bad (T.1009) . Eskelson was a former 
employee of Wright. 
7. Fraud is a multi-faceted principal of law. To 
suggest that arguing the credibility of a witness and 
suggestinq that he did not disclose all the information he 
knew in a fraud case (given Wright's ultimate admission that 
he did not disclose iraterial facts)
 f and to imply that such 
an approach creates a new standard in the area of fraud, 
simply ignores the proven facts in this case and the correct 
application of law. It is not an attempt to expand existing 
principals. 
The undersigned is personally offended by an accusation 
of unethical behavior and to make that accusation to this 
court makes it that much more offensive. If Mr. Pendleton 
has a serious complaint, he should lodge it with the office 
of the Utah State Bar Counsel, not this court. (See Rule 
8.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, effective 
January 1, 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the jury verdict of fraud and 
indemnification and also reinstate the $15,000 awarded 
Humphries for breach of the Management Agreement. 
This Court chould direct the trial court to totally 
indemnify Humphries on the $30,000 promissory note and 
direct the trial court to property calculate pre-judgment 
interest on all damages. 
Finally, this Court should sustain the attorney's fees 
awarded at trial, and award additional attorney's fees 
arising from this appeal. 
DATED this /yj^d ^ dav of March, 1989. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
HaAs Q. Chamberlain 
ttorney for Defendants and 
"Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
z*fa I hereby certify that on this / ^ ^ ' d aY c f March, 
1989, I mailed four true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT to Gary W. 
Pendleton, Attorney for Plaintiff, 150 North 200 East, Suite 
202, St. George, Utah 84770. 
Hans/Q. Chamberlain 
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AGREEMENT FOR PLRuuAo^ v^ r n j j ^ J j 
^ 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into as of this ^r- - day of 
</ d^.^-f-^nrv^^rr 7 1935, by and between V.ESTS^EE I^ *\3«.-^ , a otan Limited 
Partnersnip (Sexier ] , ana its pr: nj^oa* genera* 
HUMPHRIES, an individual of \£2SH*; 'Utah/ ("ilumohr ies" } , 
RONALD WRIGHT, an individual ("Buyer-11). 
rrner um\RZL 
and GEORGE 
RECITALS Or FACT 
A. Seller is a Utah Limited Partnership in the 
business of operating a nursery in St. George, Utah. the Limited 
Partnership has also improved and maintained certain leasehold 
property used in connection with its business at 1425 West Sunset 
Boulevard, St. George, Utah. 
B. Seller and Humphries desire that Seller sell, and 
Buyer purchase, substantially all of the assets of Seller, except 
the leasehold interest of Seller, as hereinafter detailed. 
C. Humphries desires to remain as the manager of the 
ni>rsery business at the presently existing location under a 
management contract with Buyer, to which the parties have agreed 
pursuant to a separate Employment Agreement related hereto. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the 
mutual covenants contained herein, it is hereby represented, 
agreed and covenanted between the parties as follows: 
1. Subject of Sale. The property tc be sold ; 
to this Agreement (collectively referred to as the 
herein) shall consist of substantially all of the As 
Seller/ including, without limitation: 
(a) All of the rights to the nurse.ry ; 
presently belonging to Seller, rights of assigr 
business licenses and other incancibles 
thereto; 
(b) The right to use the trade ncr.e cf MV,< 
Nursery" or any variation thereof, for the exciu 
of Buyer; 
(c) All personal property belonging to Se 
pertaining to the nursery business includ 
inventory on the premises of Seller as cf the da 
of, together with all tools, equipment, machiner 
vehicles and ail appurtenances thereto as mo: 
detailed and scheduled on Exhibit A attached her 
(d) Accounts receivable held on the book 
belonging to Seller. 
In addition, it has been agreed among the part 
Seller shall continue to lease the premises but shall all 
to operate the business to whatever extent it deems app 
so long as the terms of the lease are not violated by sue 
2. Terms of Sale. Seller will sell the 
pursuant to this Agreement and Buyer hereby purchases th 
for the amounts and payable for the following considerate 
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(a) Buyer shall deliver to Seller, certain real 
estate located in Weber County, Utah, specifically 
described on the deeds attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The original deeds transferring title to the property 
shall be executed and delivered as a part of -this Agree-
ment:. Buyer warrants that title thereto is free and 
clear, subject to taxes which are unpaid and due for the 
year 1935*^ In addition, Buyer shall provide at its own 
expense a policy of title insurance covering the value 
of the land conveyed, 
(b) Buyer shall contract with Humphries to provide 
management services on a contract basis as hereinafter 
set forth in the Contract for Management Services which 
is incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit C* 
(c) Seller shall assume all debts and obligations 
incurred by the business prior to the date of this 
Agreement. Seller represents that such debts and 
obligations are fully described on the attached Exhibit 
(d) All accounts receivable incurred by Seller 
and/or Humphries in connection with the operation of the 
business as described herein. A list of such accounts 
is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
(e) Buyer shall not assume any liabilities or 
obligations of Seller and Humphries, and Seller and 
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Humphries hereby warrant and represent to Bayer n 
of them shall have any remaining obligations ( 
creditors upon closing of th*s transaction, exce 
Promissory i;ote to ZionKs
 tVxij:st National Bank 
aruocnt of $ /S CCC^*^ ^ ^ 
J. AJJ'^t.uS ,vr"<-t l^rv DATC oJ-
-A vrwcJbt shall b 
by Cct3c /<?t> c/*^«t and miscellaneous trade accc . _ i
 k ^ . ^ 
to be asSk th»
 $ %*&*$^ no t mo c e 
Buyer. 
3. Trace tiumes. By reason of the assignment t' 
hereunder the right to use the name "nest Side Nursery" 
derivative thereof, Seller agrees not to use sale names 
names similar tnereto in connection with any other b 
engaged in by Buyer. Humphries makes the sams covenant 
extent that Humphries, in the future, may engage in an 
business. Seller further agrees that it will change its 
accordance with such laws in order to avoid any pc 
conflict with the business purchased by Buyer hereunder. 
4. Sales Taxes. Seller agrees that, 
diminishing the accounts receivable, it will pay all Uta 
sales and use taxes due for all periods ending as of t 
hereof. Buyer will be liable for all such taxes from ar 
such date. 
5. Bulk Sales Compliance. Seller agrees tha 
any creditors of Seller who would not be paid in due cc 
Buyer pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2(a) hereof, Seller ha 
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o b t a i n e d w a i v e r s of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of the Bulk S a l e s Act of t h e 
laws of t h e S t a t e of U tah or can e s t a b l i s h an exempt ion from s u c h 
l aw, and S e l l e r w i l l o b t a i n an o p i n i o n of i t s c o u n s e l s u p p o r t i n g 
t he r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s cf t h i s p a r a g a r p h . 
6- Management . P u r s u a n t to the Contrac 
Management S e r v i c e s , Z x h i b i t C, Buyer has agreec 
H u m p h r i e s , and H u m p h r i e s ha s a g r e e d to pe r fo rm s e r v i c e s , a s t h e 
manager of t h e n u r s e r y b u s i n e s s a t 1425 West Sunse t B o u l e v a r d , 
S t . G e o r g e , U t a h , as s e t f o r t h in t he C o n t r a c t for Management 
S e r v i c e s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a s Z x h i b i t C. F u r t h e r m o r e , b o t h S e l l e r 
ana r lumonr ies nave a ~ r e e a 
^ 
>eriod of i : JI 
-TV< ' C C ^ VF /Or5 Jy" \1 
A?>^^ n c r i C O ' T , ? e l i t ior n cove: 1 C . L X. or a 
s ^ . a f t e r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of H u m p h r i e s 1 
c o n t r a c t c o v e r i n g t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l s e r v i c e a r e a of Buyer a t t h e 
t ime of t e r m i n a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n t o c o n t r a c t u a l a r r a n g e m e n t s 
w i t h H u m p h r i e s , i t i s a g r e e d t h a t Buyer s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
employ ing and p a y i n g e m p l o y e e s as may be n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e 
c o n t i n u e d o p e r a t i o n of t h e n u r s e r y b u s i n e s s . However, H u m p h r i e s 
s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e fo r d a y - t o - d a y s u p e r v i s i o n of 3 u y e r ' s 
e m p l o y e e s . 
=r&-V 
-La. r n p fivftnr JOL deat-h-
disa'bility of Buyer within a period cf one vjB^ jr^ rrom the date 
hereof, Seller shall have the right^-to repurchase any and all of 
the rights conveyed hereunder for the then fair market value of 
the propertj^^rTginally transferee by Buyer to Seller as of the 
rf buuli death o: gTa&b-irxity?—p"-^ fhe val_ue of any 
oyyuL 
• q * » sj u 11 'J L L w> Crrm-JTtT- u O j u i u U u C* , £ 1- - r » w w C V 
Agreement, with interest accrued at the rate of fifteen^ 
(15%) per annum curing the one-year period. Fair^marke 
shall be established bv aooraisal cf the orcoerty transf 
Buyer to Seller. Seller shall pay the x:ost of such app 
In the event the parties are not in mutual agreement w 
findings of the appraiser hired^by^Seller, then ezch shall 
additional appraisers wiio shall thehv select an appral 
perform an appraisal, the results of which shall be pres 
be the proper considerations for the repurchase. ?ocourp 
this section, disability shall mean one hundred 
a:. s; U—2. rye 
T^e ?^-P>rrn : rg ro-)^ ^Q—p;sv:s >on-
right of^any member of Buyer's immediate family to take^ 
continue the business in the place^of Buv£-r^and ass; 
perform all of the Buyer's obligations^tlnder this Agreem 
the Contract For Management Services, Exhibit C, enteri 
immediate famiiv^to continue the business must be^made in 
to Seller^fi thin Ten (10) days of Seller's written r£q 
S^y^TJ/uG eAbi.Li-ee—tr^e—fq^::rhB^ prnvi^inr.t; nf this sect-.ir 
' 8. Maintenance of Lease. Buyer shall, on or bef 
19th day of each month, pay the amount due under Sellers 
Agreement with James La Vae Smith, dated February 23/ 1985 
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ten percent (10%). Seller shallmaintain and keep the lease of 
the premises paid up and current at all times. In the event any 
Notice of Default is delivered to Seller, Seller shall deliver a 
copy of the same to Buyer and cure such default within Ten (10) 
days of such notice. In the event Seller fails to cure default 
within Ten (10) days, Buyer may, at his discretion make the lease 
payment in the Seller's stead and may, at his discretion, 
terminate the contract for Management services, Exhibit C. 
9. Representations of Seller, In addition to 
covenants and representations hereinabove stated, Seller hereby 
represents to Buyer as follows: 
(a) Seller is a Utah Limited Partnership duly 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of 
Utah with full power to enter into this Agreement and 
execute all documents pertaining hereto; 
(b) Seller has been duly authorized by its General 
Partner to sell substantially all of the Assets and 
otherwise carry out the terms of this Agreement and 
perform its covenants hereunder; and 
(c) Seller has provided to Buyer ample opportunity 
to inspect the Assets sold hereunder together* with the 
books of account and other documents and records per-
taining thereto, and has no knowledge of any material 
obligations or contingent liabilities of Seller which 
would impact-this Agreement and which have not already 
been disclosed to Buyer or would be easily discoverable 
-7-
by an examination of the books and records of Sel 
10. General. 
(a) It is expressly understood that Buyer 
no indebtedness or obligation of any nature prese 
at any time in the future owed to any creditor bj 
or Humphries, except as expressly set forth 
Agreement, and Buyer disclaims any intent th 
Agreement or any document related hereto s! 
construed to create benefits for any othc 
creditor. 
(b) This Agreement shall be governed by 1 
of the State of Utah in its interpretation. 
(c) In the event of any legal action brc 
either party for the purpose of enforcing perfor 
any covenant or representation hereunder or for 
for breach thereof, the prevailing party s 
entitled to recover from the breaching party at 
fees and. costs as shall be determined by the Cou 
(d) In the event any written notice is 
under this Agreement, the parties shall agree t 
either personal delivery or delivery by U.S. mai 
class postage prepaid, addressed to the a 
opposite the signatures hereunder or any other 
which either party may subsequently confirm in 
to the other. 
-8-
+ x wixi t r*»p wtii-ic-ui:
 # t n e p a r t i e s n c ^ Hereun to e x e c u t e d 
t h i s Agreement e f f e c t i v e a s of t h e cay and y e a r f i r s t above 
w r i t t e n . 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, 
a Utah L i iu i t ed P a r t n e r s h i o 
3 y . V v. a 
Darrel Humphries, General Partner 
D Ln-tLiZ* R I 
^ A A ^ E ^ - I M ^ /? 
D a r r e l Hurcohries \\ 
BUYER: 
—^ y /Georgia Ronald Wr iqh t g h t (/ 
A l - 2 0 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF SELLEF. 
/9JLL "P<L/iu7 wareneU,5c<pp/tg±, *vd prrjeo*/ ffirpficrtf A. 
7 yQr- 7 ^ £ tiJeji- Stcc A/a r$c 
EXHIBIT "E" 
DEEDS TO OGDEN PROPERTY 
EXHIBIT "Dn 
SCHEDULE OF DE3TS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SELLER 
ADDENDUM B 
CONTRACT FOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
AGREE!1ENT mace between DARREL HUMPHRIES, of Veyc, Utah, 
County of Washington, State of Utah, ("Contractor") and GEORGE 
RONALD WRIGHT, whose principal place of business is located at 
City of St. George, County of- Washington, State of Utah, 
("Owner") . 
RECITALS 
1. Owner is engaged in the business of operating a 
plant nursery at wholesale and retail and related produces, and 
maintains or will maintain an ongoing business in St, George, 
County of Washington, State of Utah, 
2. Contractor has been engaged and ha^ had a great 
deal of experience in the above-designated business. 
3. Contractor is willing to perform services and Owner 
is willing to engage Contractor for management services cr. the 
terms, covenants, and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
4. Owner has pruchased the nursery from, among others, 
Contractor himself as of the date hereof. 
For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of 
the mutual promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, Owner 
and Contractor agree as follows: 
ftpp ? 5 1998 
SECTION ONE 
TERMS OF PERFORMANCE 
Owner hereby engages Contractor as a manager oi 
Side Nursery and Contractor hereby accepts and agree; 
engagement, subject to the general supervision and pu 
the orders, advice, and direction of Owner. Contrac 
perform such other duties as are customarily perform* 
holding ' such position in other, same, or similar bu 
enterprises as that engaged in by Owner, It is under£ 
Contractor is an independent proprietor and not an em 
Owner• 
SECTION TWO 
BEST EFFORTS OF CONTRACTOR 
Contractor agrees that he will at all times f^: 
industriously, and to the best of his ability, exper 
talents, perform all of the duties that may be requir 
from him pursuant to the express and implicit terms Y 
the reasonable satisfaction of Owner. 
SECTION THREE 
TERM OF CONTRACT 
The term of this Agreement shall be a period c 
year, commencing jrSrS^^^^^\ Ap/ , 1985, and t€ 
• SeotemtrgT
 f 198 ^  ^subject, however, to prior t« 
as hereinafter provided. At the expiration date this 
may be renewed for periods of one year subject to negot: 




Owner shall pay Contractor, and Contractor shall accept 
from Owner, in full payment for Contractor! s ^Jryiic^s hereunder, 
Thousand Dollars 
yd p£r year, payable twice monthly as of the 1st 
J 
and 15th day of each month while this Agreement shall be in 
force. 
Owner shall reimburse Contractor for all necessary 
expenses incurred by Contractor while traveling pursuant to 
Owner!s directions, 
SECTION FIVE 
TERMINATION DUE TO DISCONTINUANCE OF BUSINESS 
Anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, in the event that Owner shall discontinue operating its 
business at St. George, State of Utah, then this Agreement shall 
terminate as of the last day of the month on which Owner ceases 
operations at such location with the same force and effect as if 
such last day of the month were originally set as the termination 
date hereof. 
' SECTION SIX 
OTHER TIME OBLIGATIONS 
Contractor shall devote substantially all of his time, 
attention, knowledge, and skills solely to the business and 
interest of Owner, and Owner shall be entitled to all of the 
benefits, profits or other issues arising from or incident to all 
-3-
work, services, and advice of Contractor, and Contract 
not, during the terra hereof, serve as officer, c 
employee, or in any other capacity in any ether business 
to Owner's business or any allied trade; provided, howe* 
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent or ] 
right of Contractor to manage personal and family in\ 
that do not compete with Ownerfs business, 
SECTION SEVEN 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OPERATIONS 
Contractor shall make available to employer all 
ticn of which Contractor shall have any knowledge and sh 
all suggestions and recommendations that will be of muti 
fit to Owner and himself. 
SECTION EIGHT 
TRADE SECRETS ' 
Contractor shall not at any time or in any 
either directly or indirectly, divulge, disclose or con 
to any person, firm or corporation in any manner whatsc 
information concerning any matters affecting or relatin 
business of Owner, including without limiting the gener 
the foregoing, any of its customers, the prices it obtair 
obtained from the sale of, or at which it sells or has £ 
products, source of supply, or any other information cc 
the business of Owner, its manner of operation, its pla 
cesses, or other data without regard to whether all of t 
going matters will be deemed confidential, material, o 
-4-
tant, the parties hereto stipulating that as between them, the 
same are important, material, and confidential and gravely affedt 
the effective and successful conduct of the business of Owner, 
and Owner's good will, and that any breach of the terms of this 
paragraph shall be a material breach of this Agreement, 
SECTION NINE 
AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE OF CONTRACT 
This contract contains the complete agreement concerning 
the arrangement between the parties and shall, as of the effec-
tive date hereof, supersede all other agreements between the 
parties. However, this contract shall be consistent with a Pur-
chase cf Assets Agreement of even date herewith. The parties 
stipulate that neither of them has made any representation with 
respect to the subject matter cf this Agreement or any represent-
ations including the execution and delivery hereof except such 
representations as are specifically set forth herein and each of 
the parties hereto acknowledges that he or it has relied on its 
own judgment in entering into this Agreement. The parties hereto 
further acknowledge that any payments oS representations that may 
have heretofore been made by either cf them to* the other are of 
no effect and that neither of them has relied thereon in connec-
tion with his or its dealings with the other. 
SECTION TEN 
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 
No waiver or modification of this Agreement or of any 
covenant, condition, or limitation herein contained shall be 
-5-
valid unless in writing and duly executed by the p 
charged therewith and no evidence of any proceeding, a: 
cr litigation between the parties hereto arising 
affecting this Agreement, or the rights or obligati* 
parties hereunder, unless such waiver or modification : 
inc, duly executed as aforesaid, and the parties fur 
that the provisions of this section may not be waived 
herein set forth. 
SECTION ELEVEN 
TERMINATION 
In the event of any violation by Contractor 
the terms of this contract, Owner thereon may term 
Management Agreement without notice and with pay only t 
of such -termination. It is further agreed that any 
evasion of any of the terms of this contract by eU 
hereto will result in immediate and irreparable inju 
other party and will authorize recourse to injuncti 
specific performance as well as to all other legal or 
remedies to which such injured party may be entitled he 
SECTION TWELVE 
NONCOMPETITION COVENANT 
Upon termination of this contract for causi 
expiration hereof by its Jtodrms //Contractor agrees t 
period of r^^ _^-j=giw ^^r <J p\ f f-Y r the date of such term: 
shall not compete with the nursery, gardening sales an< 
sales, related business of Owner by serving in any 
-6-
proprietorship, partnership/ corporation or otherwise, in the 
States of Utah, Nevada, Oregon or Arizona. Contractor acknow-
ledges that the restrictions above stated are reasonable. It is 
agreed between the parties that the consideration for the non-
competition covenant is the Agreement for Partial Purchase cf 
Assets executed on the same date hereof, pursuant to which Owner 
purchased the personal property assets of West Side Nursery, the 




All agreements and covenants contained herein are sever-
able, and in the event any of them shall be held to be invalid by 
any competent court, this contract shall be interpreted as if 
such invalid agreements or covenants were not contained herein. 
SECTION FOURTEEN 
CHOICE OF LAW 
It is the intention of the parties hereto that this 
Agreement and the performance hereunder and all suits and special 
proceedings hereunder be construed in accordance with and under 
and pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto executed 
-7-
t h i s c o n t r a c t e f f e c t i v e as of -SHnfgsSer , 1985 . 
OWNER: 
George /Rona ld W r i g h t 
/ 
CONTRACTOR: 
D a r r e l Humphr i e s^ 
A l - 2 1 
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ADDENDUM C 
December 10, 1985 
Certified Mail - Return 
Receipt Requested 
Mr. George Ronald Wright 
138 S. Valley View Dr., 
The Park - Green Valley 
St. George, Utah 84770 
RE: Westside Nursery 
Dear Mr. Wright: 
Please be advised that I represent Darrel Humphries of St. 
George, Utah, concerning the business relationship the two of you 
have established over the past few months. 
As you know, Mr. Humphries has been advised that the 
property you traded to him located in Ogden, Utah is basically 
worthless at the present time, and we should have in our 
possession appraisals that will substantiate this position within 
the next couple of days. Because the property does not have the 
value you represented, to-wit, $90,000, it is Mr. Humphries' 
position as follows: 
1. That he be paid the sum of $60,0 00 cash upon 
receipt of this letter, or that you obtain an appraisal 
from an MIA appraiser that the property does in fact have 
a value of $90,000. 
2. That the note owed to Zions First National Bank 
in the sum of $15,000 be paid by you immediately. 
3. That you deposit such funds as may be necessary 
to cover the overdraft in the business account of 
approximately $11,000 to $12,000. 
4. That Mr. Humphries retain both the 1984 Ford 
3/4 ton 4-wheel drive pickup and the 1983 Mercury, with 
Mr. Humphries to assume and pay all encumbrances thereon. 
5. That if you comply with the above, Mr. Humphries 
will agree to stay on at the nursery as long as you want 
him to at the same salary he currently receives and he 
will train all personnel you desire. i DEFENDANT'S 
1 EXHIBIT 
Mr. George Ronald Wright 
December 10, 1985 
Page 2 
Re: Westside Nursery 
If you choose not to perform as set forth above, then Mr. 
Humphries would request the following: 
1. That you return the nursery, together with all 
inventory and other personal property to him. 
2. That you pay to Mr. Humphries the sum of $4,000 
he has incurred in labor costs, together with the sum of 
$2,000 he has incurred in heating the nursery during the 
interim period, for a total of $6,000, and to pay that 
amount at the time the nursery is returned. 
3. That you provide him with all documentation 
necessary so he can establish what merchandise has been 
ordered, and to reject merchandise he may not elect to 
retain. 
Mr. Humprhies is hopeful that this matter can be resolved 
short of litigation. However, because of the critical time of 
the year and the need to plan and plant for the spring season, we 
must request a decision from you within five (5) days from 
receipt of this letter. If we do not hear from you within that 
time frame, we will assume that any offer to settle this matter 
short of litigation has been rejected and will proceed 
accordingly. 
So there is no misunderstanding concerning this matter, 
this letter is also to serve notice that Mr. Humphries elects to 
rescind the purported Agreement for Purchase of Assets and the 
contract for management services based upon his recently acquired 
knowledge concerning the value of the property you traded to him 
in exchange for the business known as the Westside Nursery. 
Please direct all correspondence or other communication to 
my office as set forth above. 
Yours very truly, 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Hans Q. Chamberlain 
HQC/db 
ADDENDUM D 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
HANS Q. C H A M B E R L A I N 
THOMAS M. H I G B E E 
FLOYO W HOLM 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
P. O. B O X 7 2 6 
2 5 0 S O U T H M A I N 
CEDAR CITY, UTAH 8 4 7 2 0 
AREA CODE S O I 
TELEPHONE 5 8 6 - 4 4 0 4 
December 18, 19 85 
Mr. George Ronald Wright 
1021 S. Valley View Dr., #138 
The Park - Green Valley 
St. George, Utah 84770 
RE: Westside Nursery 
Dear Mr. Wright: 
I enclose herewith a copy of my letter to you dated 
December 10th, 1985, that was sent certified mail - return 
receipt requested. It appears that you have intentionally failed 
to receipt for this letter and I am therefore having you served 
personally with a copy of the same. However, all offers to 
settle this matter set forth in said letter are hereby revoked. 
Mr. Humphries is willing, however, to discuss a cash settlement 
if you still desire to purchase the Westside Nursery. 
We now have in our possession an appraisal which indicates 
that the property you have deeded to Mr. and Mrs. Humphries has a 
present value of $35,000, and not the value of $90,000 that you 
represented it had. In addition, we have clear evidence that you 
met with Mr. Graham Shirra of the Weber Planning Commission 3 to 
4 months prior to the sewer moratorium and that you were advised 
that a moratorium would be placed on the subject property many 
months prior to the time it was enacted on October 15th, 1985. 
The fact that you deeded the subject property to Mr. and Mrs. 
Humphries some 11 days prior to the moratorium becoming effective 
gives rise to other speculation as to the timeliness of that 
transaction. 
It is therefore the position of Mr. Humphries that the 
purported Sales Agreement dated October 4th, 1985, between 
Westside Nursery, a Utah limited partnership, as seller and 
yourself as buyer, and the Contract for Management Services of 
the same date, are hereby cancelled and rescinded on the basis 
that the seller therein, Westside Nursery, did not receive 
property having a value you represented it to have, to-wit, 
$90,000, that the property cannot be developed because of a 
building moratorium placed upon the property, and for other 




C H A M B E R L A I N & H I G L E 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
Mr. George R. Wright 
December 18, 1985 
Page 2 
Re: Westside Nursery 
Enclosed herewith are copies of deeds that I have prepared 
wherein Darrel Eugene Humpries and Karen Ann Humpries, his wife, 
deed back the property located in Weber County, Utah, you 
previously deeded to them by deed dated October 4th, 1985. These 
deeds should be recorded in Weber County by you upon receipt. By 
reason of the same, it is the position of Mr. Humphries and 
Westside Nursery that said business is still owned by Westside 
Nursery, a Utah limited partnership, and that in an attempt to 
restore the parties to their positions prior to the purported 
sale on October 4th, 1985, that the following terms shall 
control: 
1. That since Mr. and Mrs. Humphries have deeded 
back the real property conveyed by you to them, that you 
likewise release in writing any interest you had in the 
business known as Westside Nursery so that there is no 
misunderstanding as to the status of this matter. In that 
connection, I enclose an Agreement that I would ask you to 
sign before a notary public and return the same to my 
office in the enclosed stamped, self-addressed envelope. 
This agreement has already been signed by my clients. 
2. That you remove, within five (5) days from 
receipt of this letter, all of the furniture, self-
watering containers, brass, copper and ceramic items you 
purchased and had delivered to the premises. The removal 
of these items should take place in the presence of Mr. 
Humphries. 
3. Because the eucalyptus trees purchased by you are 
fragile and cannot be simply moved outdoors, Mr. Humphries 
is agreeable to resolve this particular item on one of the 
following bases: 
A. That you sell the eucalyptus trees to Mr. 
Humphries at the original price you purchased them 
for. Upon documented proof that the trees have in 
fact been paid for (i.e., a copy of your cancelled 
check, charge card receipt or other proof of 
payment), a cashier's check will be delivered to you 
in that amount. 
B. That if you want to retain ownership of the 
trees until you can relocate them to another nursery 
or place of your choosing, that you pay to Westside 
/ 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBI 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
Mr. George R. Wright 
December 18, 1985 
Page 3 
Re: Westside Nursery 
Nursery the sum of $2.50 per month per treef payment 
to be made in advance for six (6) months, to-wit, for 
October, November, and December, last past, and for 
January,. February and March, in the future. The 
number of trees can be determined by a mutual count 
to be conducted by yourself and Mr. Humphries or 
someone else if you determine that would be most 
appropriate. 
C. That if number A or B above are not 
acceptable, that you immediately remove the trees 
from the premises and reimburse Mr. Humphries for 
expenses incurred to date in caring for the trees in 
the form of labor, soil, greenhouse expenses, and 
containers, at the rate of $2.00 per tree times the 
total number of trees located in the greenhouse. If 
you elect to accept this alternative, the trees must 
be removed within five (5) days, since Mr. Humphries 
simply must have the greenhouse space to commence the 
planting for the springtime season in St. George 
which is approximately 6 to 8 weeks away. Time is 
extremely critical and Mr. Humphries cannot wait 
beyond this five (5) day period to commence planting; 
he simply must do that immediately. 
4. In the event you simply fail to do nothing in 
response to the requests outlined above, Mr. Humphries 
will assume ownership of all growing materials you have 
purchased and caused to be placed upon the subject 
property and pay for the same, be it yourself or the 
actual supplier of the product. Everything else that you 
purchased and caused to be delivered to the nursery will 
be delivered to your driveway five (5) days after you are 
served with this document. 
On behalf of Mr. Humphries, this letter constitutes an 
offer to reconvey any property obtained from you under both 
contracts dated October 4th, 1985, to you and to restore 
everything of value which was received from you, and to surrender 
the possession of the property you deeded located in Weber 
County, Utah, and to do and perform all acts and things which 
might be necessary or proper in order to fully and immediately 
restore to you all of the properties and things of value received 
i 
CHAMBERLAIN & H I G B ^ £ 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
Mr. George R. Wright 
December 18, 1985 
Page 4 
Re: Westside Nursery 
from you, as fully and completely as if said contracts had never 
been made. 
Please govern yourself accordingly. 
Yours very truly, 
CHAMBERJ/XlN & HIGBEE /") 
fans Q. Chamberlain 
HQC/db 
enclosures 
xc: Mr. Darrel E. Humphries 
ADDENDUM E 
ASSETS-





AUTO AND TRUCKS 
AUTO *: TRUCKS DEPRECIAT 
EQUIPMENT AND FIXTURES 
EQUIP & FIXTURE DEPREC.. 
LEASE IMPROVEMENTS 
LEASE IMPROVEMENT DEPRECI 
FIXED ASSETS 
TGTAL ASSETS 
C- , O wJ * J 4 'J J 
60,000.00 
:
 1 ;J - 2 O 4 u O u 
0. O 0 
o , •_. 
0, 00 
-V *—r w tr \—' • / • X 
Total Assets $112,042.74 
Liabi1i ties 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 
NOTES PAYABLE OVER 1 YR. 
SALES TAX PAYABLE 
NOTES PAYABLE ZIONS BANK 
NOTES PAYABLE 4*2 ZIONS 

























RESCLOTIOK OF THE BOARD OF COOKTT COMMISSIONERS '._' ~''^ 
OF WEBER COONTY, UTAH M*J-
IK 
WHEREAS, the publ ic health and welfare concerns of c i t i z e n s of Veber 
iunty d i c t a t e that i t i s accessary to impose a l imi ted moratorium on 
velopcient of any property located wi th in the boundaries of the Uintah 
ghlands Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t • 
NOV, THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED AND ORDERED, pursuant to the authority of 
e Veber County Commission granted under Utah Code Annotated Sect ions 17-5-35, 
-5 -4Q, and 17-5-77 , that a l imited moratorium on the development of any 
cperty l oca ted w i t h i n the boundaries of the Dintah Highlands Water'and Sewer 
provement D i s t r i c t i s hereby implemented under the fol lowing terms unt i l an 
equate , approved publ ic sewer system has been constructed and i s operat ional : „ , y. 
1 . ) As of the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s moratorium, no new subdiv is ions in -r} 
e Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t w i l l be approved. 
i 2^) Any proposed except ion to paragraph 1 must be approved by the Weber 
unty Commission and be substantiated by a wri t ten statement from the 
berN-Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department that the subdivis ion i s located i n an 
ea where i t s development w i l l not contaminate, aggravate, depreciate , or i n 
Y manner have a negat ive impact on present s o i l , groundwater, surface water, 
drainage c o n d i t i o n s i n the Dintah Highlands Water and Sewer Improvement 
s t r i c t . 
3* Prior to the development of any individual l o t , including those 
sated i n e x i s t i n g subdiv i s ion , the developer must f i r s t obtain wr i t t en 
proval from the Weber-Morgan D i s t r i c t Health Department to ensure that : 
a. A currehtTcomprehensive soULajaod groundwater evaluation has been 
* = *} 
ie of the s i t e ;
 1Qn-
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Z DEFENDANT'S I 
X EYUIRIT I 
b. Soil and groundwater conditions are in fu l l compliance with a l l 
s t a t e and loca l r u l e s , regula t ions , codes and ordinances per ta ining to 
ind iv idua l wastewater disposal systems; and 
c. The proposed development wi l l not contaminate, aggravate, 
dep rec i a t e , or in any manner have a negative impact on present s o i l , 
groundwater, surface water or drainage conditions in the Dintah Highlands Wati 
and Sewer Improvement D i s t r i c t . 
d. I t i s contempla ted t h a t these l o t s w i l l be cons idered and approv 
or r e j e c t e d on an i n d i v i d u a l , case -by-case b a s i s . 
In t h e op in ion of t h e Weber County Board of Commissioners, i t s i s 
n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h i s p o l i c y go i n t o e f f ec t immediately upon p u b l i c a t i o n i n ord 
t o p r e s e r v e t h e h e a l t h of t he i n h a b i t a n t s of Weber County. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Board of County Commissioners of Weber County, 
Otah a t a r e g u l a r mee t ing t h e r e o f held on the / ^ day of OcZci^c^ , 
1985. 
BOARD OF.WJ^ feR COUNTY 13#&ISSI0NERS 
ATTEST: 
RICHARD GREENE 
DEPUTY CLERK ^ (J 
4L 
ADDENDUM G 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
ISSUED BY 
Security Title Company 
205 - 26TH STREET • OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
(801)627-1320 
George R. Wright Order No: 5869*+ 
St. George Utah 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, herein called the Company, for valuable consideration, 
hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed 
Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or 
referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules 
A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy 
or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuance 
of this Commitment or by subsequent indorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and obli-
gations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or policies 
committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fault 
of the Company. This Commitment shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by an authorized officer or agent. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Commitment to be signed and sealed, to become valid when 
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. This Commitment 
is effective as of the date shown in Schedule A as "Effective Date." 
hOPm 1756-A 
Commitment, Schedule A 
SCHEDULE A 
1. Effective Date: Oc tobe r 1 , 1985 @ 7 :55 a . m . Commitment Mo: 58694 
2. Policy or Policies to be issued: Amount 
(a) E ALTA Owner's Policy F o r amount To Be D e t e r m i n e d $TBD 
Proposed Insured: 
(b) • ALTA Loan Policy $ 
Proposed Insured: 
(0 • $ 
3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this commitment and covered herein is fee simple and 
title thereto is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
GEORGE R. WRIGHT 
4. The land referred to in this commitment is 
PARCEL 1: (Serial No. Q7-086-G007) 
A part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U. 5. Survey: Beginning at the Southwest Quarter 
corner of the Northeast Quarter of said Northwest Quarter of said Section; thence 
Northeasterly 130 feet more or less, along the South line of the Cory Combe 
property, to a point 33 feet perpendicularly distant Southwesterly from the 
centerline of Combe Road; thence Southeasterly 130 feet, more or less along the 
Southwesterly line of Combe Road to a Point on the l/16th Section line; thence West 
205 feet, more or less, along said 1/16 Section line to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: (Serial No. pt 07-086-0003) 
A part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. U. S. Survey: Beginning at the most Easterly corner of 
Lot 55, Uintah Highlands Subdivision No. 4, in Weber County, Utah; and running 
thence along the Northeasterly boundary of said Subdivision the following four (4) 
courses: North 67°47f50" West 117.54 feet; North 4U47' West 104.12 feet; North 
74°41'57" West 109.40 feet; and North 23°20' West 324.03 feet; more or less to the 
North line of the Southwest Quarter of said Northwest Quarter; thence East 255 feet 
more or less to a point 33 feet perpendicularly distance Southwesterly from the 
centerline of Combe Road; thence Southeasterly 178 feet, more or less, along the 
Southwesterly line of Combe Road; thence Southwesterly 455 feet more or less to 
the point of beginning. 
• u n . i . x / J W - JQ<. \ n c v u c u JUiy, iv/Z) 
Commitment, Schedule B-2 
SCHEDULE B - Section 2 No. 58694 
Exceptions 
The policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to the 
satisfaction of the Company. 
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies 
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained 
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct 
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by public records. 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; 
water rights, claims or title to water. 
6. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law 
and not shown by the public records. 
7. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the public rec-
ords or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed insured acquires 
of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this commitment. 
8. Taxes for the year 1985, payable but not delinquent. (Serial No. 07-086-0007 and 
part of 07-086-0003). 
9. Any charges and/or assessments that may be levied by the Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, the Uintah-Highland Water and Sewer Improvement District, 
the Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, and the Weber County Fire 
Protection Service Area #4. 
10. The right to construct, operate, and maintain its line of telephone and telegraph 
over and across the West half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 
5 North, Range 1 West, (exact location not disclosed), as conveyed to Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, by Instrument recorded November 1, 
1918 in Book N, Page 176 of Records. 
11. Rights of Way for roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines, if any, now 
existing over and across said property. 
CONTINUED 
Exceptions numbered ! L _ Z _ _ are hereby omitted. 
SCHEDULE "B" CONTINUED 
12. A Perpetual Easement to construct, reconstruct, operate, repair, replace and 
maintain a culinary water line over and across Parcel 1 as follows: A 15 foot 
wide permanent easement, 10 feet on the West side and 5 feet on the East side 
of the following described centerline: A part of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point on the subdivision boundary of Uintah-Highlands 
Subdivision No. 4, Weber County, Utah, being South 74°41'57" East 12.80 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Lot 49 in said Subdivision; running thence North 
23°20' West 206.71 feet; thence North 0°04'30" West 451.10 feet to the North 
line of the Grantors property in Combe Road, as conveyed to UINTAH-HIGHLAND 
WATER AND SEWER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, by Instrument recorded January 
15, 1981 in Book 1374, Page 1660 of Records. 
13. Application for Assessment and Taxation of the subject property as Agricultural 
Land recorded December 23, 1975 in Book 1109, Page 477 of Records. Said 
Application contains a five year rollback provision which becomes effective upon 
change in use of all or part of the subject property. 
14. Special Assessments in favor of UINTAH-HIGHLAND WATER AND SEWER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, as set forth in Instrument recorded January 18, 1985 
in Book 1461, Page 17 of Records. 
15. Delinquent taxes for the years 1981, 1983 and 1984 in the total amount of 
$398.06 as to Serial No. 07-086-0007. 
* * * 
1985 taxes are $158.54 including $000 personal property valuation 
as to Serial No. 07-086-0007 and taxes for Serial No. 07-086-0003 are not segregated. 
COMMITMENT 
Conditions and Stipulations 
1. The term "mortgage," when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument. 
2. If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other 
matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other than those shown 
in Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be 
relieved from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon to the extent the Company 
is prejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to 
the Company, or if the Company otherwise acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, 
adverse claim or other matter, the Company at its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, 
but such amendment shall not relieve the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of 
these Conditions and Stipulations. 
3. Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such parties 
included under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only for actual loss 
incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or (b) to 
eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B, or (c) to acquire or create the estate of interest or mortgage thereon 
covered by this Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the 
policy or policies committed for and such liability is subject to the Insuring provisions, exclusion from coverage, 
and the Conditions and Stipulations of the form of policy or policies committed for in favor of the proposed 
Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part of this Commitment except as expressly 
modified herein. 
4. Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and which arises out of the status of the title 
to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage covered hereby or any action asserting such claim, 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN [0607] 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
250 South Main 
P. 0. Box 726 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 586-4404 
• r -i ( 1 n Pii 1 05 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 



















i AT LAW 
TH MAIN 
DX 726 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 85-0536 
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial pursuant to 
notice duly given on April 25th, 1988, in the Washington County 
Courthouse before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court 
Judge presiding. Present were Plaintiff George Ronald Wright, 
and his counsel, Gary Pendleton. Also present was Defendant 
Darrel Humphries, general partner in Westside Nursery, a Utah 
limited partnership and Darrel Humphries, an individual, and 
their counsel, Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
This matter has been the subject of prior orders which are 
affirmed in this Judgment. These orders include: 
1. Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause 
dated December 23rd, 1985. 
2. Temporary Restraining Order; Order Appointing Receiver? 
Judgment; and Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment 
25th, 1986. 
3. Findings of Fact and Temporary Order dated 
1986. 
4. Findings and Order dated November 10th, 1986 
The jury was empaneled and the parties proceed* 
opening statements. Plaintiff proceeded with the pre 
his case. Plaintiff rested. Defendants thereafter 
their case. 
After the Defendants rested their case pursuani 
counterclaim, Plaintiff moved for a dismissal or dire 
against Defendants' counterclaim alleging fraud. Af 
said argument, the same was denied by the Court. 
Following the order of the Court entered denying 
motion to dismiss, the jury was called in and ins 
Arguments were made, and the matter was duly submit* 
jury. The jury returned a verdict as follows: 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
V7ASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 85-053 
Defendants. 
We the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter, 
findf by the agreement of at least six of our number: 
1. Did Defendant Darrel Humphries breach the agreements 
between the parties by actions inconsistent with the terms of the 
agreements? 
YES X NO 
2. If your answer to No, 1 is Yes, what damages should be 
awarded to Plaintiff George Ronald Wright as a result of the 
breach? 
S 6,805.00 
3. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements 
between the parties by terminating Defendant Darrel Humphries as 
an employee under the Management Agreement? 
YES X NO 
4. If your answer to No. 3 is Yes, what damages should be 
awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a result of the breach? 
$ 15,000.00 
5. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright breach the agreements 
in any other respect? YES X NO 
6. If your answer to No. 5 is Yes, what should be the 
amount of damages awarded to Defendant Darrel Humphries as a 
result of that breach? $ 0 
7. Under the agreements, who was to pay the first $5,000 of 
the accounts payable as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF X DEFENDANT 
8. Under the agreements, who was to pay the 
payable in excess of $5,000 as of October 4, 1985? 
PLAINTIFF DEF 
9. Under the agreements, who was to receive tt 
receivable owed tc Westside Nursery as of October 4, 
PLAINTIFF X DEF 
10. Under the terms of the agreements, between P 
Defendant Darrel Humphries, who is obligated to j 
Promissory Note in favor cf Zions First National Ban* 
of $15,00C, plus accrued interest dated January 3, 19 
PLAINTIFF DEF 
11. As betw7een Plaintiff and Defendant Darrel Hu 
is obligated to pay the Promissory Note in favor of 
National Bank in the sum of $30,000, plus accrued int 
December 198 5? 
PLAINTIFF X DEF 
12. Did Plaintiff George Ronald Wright make f 
misrepresentations concerning the value of the Web< 
property to Defendants? YES X 
13. If your answer to question No. 12 is Yes, wh 
damages should be awarded to Defendants Westside Ni: 
Darrel Humphries for the difference in the actual f 
value of the land in Weber County and the misrepreser 
that land? $ 38,582.00 
14. What is the amount of attorney's fee, if 

























S AT LAW 
TH MAIN 
ir»v -»»« 
PLAINTIFF GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT 
DEFENDANTS WESTSIDE NURSERY and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES $ 10,000.00 
THE ABOVE STATES THE OPINION OF THIS JURY. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 1988. 
/s/ Clayton Prince 
Foreperson 
DISSENTING JURORS 
Ey each answer number, list the names, if any, of the jurors 
dissenting from that answer: 
ANSWER 





























The Court ir.ade some inquiry of the jury concerni 
findings. Neither counsel requested that the jury 
after returning the verdict and the jury was then exc 
NOV;, THEREFORE, based upon the findings of the j-
applicable principles of law, 
1 0
 || IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as fo 
1. Defendant Humphries shall have and recover 
Plaintiff Judgment in the amount of $20,198.21 com 
follows: 
A. Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment in th 
|| $37,305.21 as reimbursement for funds borrowed 
16 
17 
First National Bank and deposited directly into 
Nursery checking account. Against this sum, PI 
entitled to setoffs in the amount of $6,805 
reimbursement for monies misappropriated by I 
Humphries from the Westside Nursery account for 
of personal obligations and $6,772.00 as reimbu 
funds withdrawn from the Westside Nursery accc 
October 4th, 1985, for the purpose of paying ac< 
should have been assumed and discharged by Defei 























setoff also includes interest which has been calculated at 
the legal rate on the above-mentioned items from the date of 
the misappropriation or expenditure. 
2. Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries are awarded 
Judgment against Plaintiff for the difference in the actual fair 
market value of the land in Weber County and the misrepresented 
value cf said land in the sum of $38,582.00. The damages awarded 
by the jury were calculated by the jury based on a fraudulent 
misrepresentation concerning the value of the Weber property to 
be $90,000.00, less the sum of $54,700.00 and less the real 
estate commission Westside Nursery and Humphries had to pay in 
selling the property of $3,282.00, thus totaling a difference of 
$38,582.00. Said Judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 
twelve percent (12%) per annum until paid in full. The Court 
will not award interest to Defendants on the sum of $38,582.00 
from and after October 4th, 1985 until time of Judgment, even 
though requested to do so by Defendants. 
3. Plaintiff is not contractually bound to assume or 
indemnify Defendant Humphries against any obligation in favor of 
Zions First National Bank arising out of the execution of a 
certain Promissory Note dated January 3rd, 1985. 
4. Defendants are obligated to pay and discharge all 
accounts payable as of October 4th, 1985, to the extent that said 
accounts exceeded the sum of $5,000.00 and are further obligated 
to pay all outstanding tax obligations, federal, state or local, 
accruing on or before October 4th, 1985. 
ERLAIN 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
aSO SOUTH MAIN 
5. Even though the jury found that Plaintiff br< 
agreements between the parties by terminating Defendan-
as an employee under the Management Agreement and 
Humphries damages in the sum of $15,000.00 by reason o 
the Court concludes and orders that Defendant Humphri 
for wrongful termination of the Management Agreement i 
with prejudice, the jury!s findings regarding specific 
fact establishing the defense of justification as a i 
law. 
6. Defendants Westside Nursery and Humphries ar 
Judgment against Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000.00 a 
attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of this ac 
7. Defendants Humphries and Westside Nursery arc 
awarded a total Judgment against Plaintiff in the 
$68,780.21, said Judgment to bear interest at the rate 
percent (12%) per annum until paid in full. 
DATED this V — day of ( x ^ ^ ^ ^ i 
T 
J/ PHILIP EV^S 
District Court Judg 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
VAiiC&cn iL 
H,XNS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
to Mr, Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney at Law, 150 North Second East, 
Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, first-class postage prepaid, 
on this 5th day of August, 1988. 
£ dcretary ,. 
ADDENDUM J 
i ^DEFENDANT'S ^EXHIBIT I f 
